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The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Real Estate 
Development Finance in Queensland 
 
BRYANT, Lyndall1  
 
Abstract:   Before the Global Financial Crisis  many providers of finance had growth mandates and actively pursued development 
finance deals as a way of gaining higher returns on funds with regular capital turnover and re-investment possible.  This was able to be 
achieved through high gearing and low presales in a strong market.  As asset prices fell, loan covenants breached and memories of the 
1990‟s returned, banks rapidly adjusted their risk appetite via retraction of gearing and expansion of presale requirements.   
Early signs of loosening in bank credit policy are emerging, however parties seeking development finance are faced with a severely 
reduced number of institutions from which to source funding.  The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best credit 
risks by way of constrictive credit conditions including:  low loan to value ratios, the corresponding requirement to contribute high levels of 
equity, lack of support in non-prime locations and the requirement for only borrowers with well established track records.  In this risk 
averse and capital constrained environment, the ability of developers to proceed with real estate developments is still being constrained by 
their inability to obtain project finance.   
This paper will examine the pre and post GFC development finance environment.  It will identify the key lending criteria relevant to 
real estate development finance and will detail the related changes to credit policies over this period.  The associated impact to real estate 
development projects will be presented, highlighting the significant constraint to supply that the inability to obtain finance poses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Australian property market, in line with international trends, 
suffered significant losses as the global financial crisis (GFC) took 
hold.  Significant asset value write downs occurred and banks and 
non-bank lenders withdrew funding support.  Bank credit policies 
retracted to a near zero risk position and many foreign and non-
bank lenders exited the market.   
In this paper, we examine the ongoing impact of the GFC 
specifically on the real estate development industry, its inability to 
access development finance and impact on the development 
industry, particularly in the housing market.  The State of 
Queensland is used as a case study, however the key findings have 
relevance to all major markets in Australia. 
 
1.1. What is Development Finance? 
 
It is appropriate to differentiate development finance from more 
traditional property investment lending.  Lending for property 
investment is traditionally associated with an income producing 
property, whereby the income in either full or part, is used to 
service the loan.  The loan is for a fixed term of between say, two 
to five years, the end of which the property is either onsold and the 
debt repaid, or the loan is otherwise refinanced on new terms and 
conditions.  The terms and conditions of the loan are primarily 
associated with the maximum loan to value ratio (LVR), minimum 
interest cover, weighted average lease expiry and quality of the 
property and borrower generally.    
In contrast, development finance is a form of project finance; a 
type of specialised lending whereby the credit risks are assessed 
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and tranches of borrowing instruments are structured to deal with 
specific risks of the project  (Weaver and Kingsley 2000).   
Development funding is provided throughout the development 
process, and can include funding for:  acquisition, design, statutory 
approvals, marketing, construction and sale/leasing components of 
the development process.  Lenders assess the various risks 
associated with each stage of development and make credit and 
pricing decisions based on what mitigants the developer has in 
place.   
Development facilities are traditionally highly geared with 
limited or no recourse to the developer, with project assets often 
the only tangible form of security given.  Gearing is based on loan 
to cost ratios (LCR) as it is the cost to deliver the end product that 
requires funding, as opposed to the acquisition cost of an 
investment property.  There is often no positive cashflow 
throughout the duration of the loan.  Interest is capitalised and the 
loan is repaid from the net revenue of the project.  Payout or 
refinancing of the loan occurs upon successful completion, with 
profit distribution made only after all debts, interest and fees are 
repaid.  Lenders are compensated for the higher risks by an 
associated return by way of margin and fees  (Weaver and 
Kingsley 2000).   
Therefore, the credit risk appetite of lenders, and their access to 
specialist skills to identify, forecast and assess the many risks 
involved is a key determinant of the success of this type of finance, 
and hence its availability.  
Different tranches of funding reflect varying risks and required 
returns.  These can include a combination of:  equity, preferred 
equity, mezzanine, junior debt and senior debt, each with a 
differing risk/security profile and a corresponding return 
expectation (Bryant 2009).  Often these tranches are provided by 
different sources, with complex inter-party agreements 
documenting the priority of payments.  The relative positioning of 
each in such a multi-loan configuration is illustrated below, by the 
metaphoric concept of a ‟funding silo„.   
 Figure 1: Development Finance ’Funding Silo’ 
Source:  Bryant 2009 
 
 
1.2. Banking Sector Retraction 
The world‟s financial markets have undergone significant changes 
over the past two to three years as the initial impact and subsequent 
aftershocks of the US subprime crisis have and continue to play 
out.  Large international banking institutions such as Lehman 
Brothers cease to exist, whilst others survive only by the actions of 
government intervention in many of their respective countries.   
The banking industry in Australia was somewhat insulated by 
its limited direct exposure to the subprime financial products and a 
sound regulatory system.  However, liquidity and refinancing 
became an issue in 2008 as foreign banks repatriated capital from 
Australia to focus on balance sheets at home, eroded by losses 
from asset write-downs and write-offs. Further, Australian banks‟ 
heavy dependence on offshore funding resulted in an increased cost 
of funds to the banks, flowing on to higher lending rates to 
consumers and greater competition for the limited funds available  
(Brown and Davis 2008; Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics 2009).   
Providers of development finance can come in a variety of 
sources, including bank and other non-bank intermediaries.  Prior 
to the GFC, these included the Big 4 banks, regional and foreign 
banks, mortgage trusts, mezzanine funds, debenture lenders, 
investment banks and private equity. 
Since the end of 2007, the majority of these sources of 
commercial property loans have virtually ‟dried up„.  This includes 
the listed and unlisted mortgage and mezzanine funds which fall 
into the ‟non-bank intermediary„ category (Rowland 2010). 
In the ready credit days of 2007, there were 44 property finance 
lenders active in the Queensland market.  As banks scaled back 
their corporate lending portfolios and foreign banks backed out of 
the Australian market, this number quickly reduced to just six in 
2010 (Ashe Morgan Winthrop 2009). 
 
1.3. Property Sector Impacts 
As the GFC took hold, in January 2009 the Federal 
Government recognised the potential crisis of limited credit in 
commercial property markets.  Loan covenants were breached as 
asset values fell, refinancing was not an option due to closure of 
debt markets, and any prospective purchasers were equally unable 
to secure debt. The market feared asset price freefall and a return to 
the recession of the early 1990s.  The Federal Government 
responded with the proposed Australian Business Investment 
Partnership, colloquially known as ‟Rudd Bank„.  This $4 billion 
venture between the Federal Government and the Big 4 banks was 
proposed to help commercial property players refinance their debts 
in the absence of foreign money and other capital market 
alternatives.  It was proposed as a temporary measure to avoid 
recession driving mass asset price write downs and fire sales 
reminiscent of the early 1990s.  (Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics 2009).   After a number of months in evolution, the bill 
was eventually rejected by the Senate in mid 2009, co-inciding 
with capital markets tentatively reopening.  
In any event, the purpose of the Australian Business 
Investment Partnership was specifically to prevent the large scale 
write down in asset values of commercial income producing 
property, not to fund new development activity.  The sources of 
such funding remain limited, given the exit of foreign banks and 
risk aversion of domestic banks.   
APRA provides some measure of the scale of this issue, albeit 
the most recent data is somewhat dated.  As of September 2008, 
33% of foreign banks‟ commercial property loan books comprised 
funding for land and residential development.  The major banks‟ 
exposure was 22.8% of their total commercial property loan book, 
and other domestic banks comprised 26.2%.  Withdrawal of 
foreign and smaller domestic banks from this market leaves a 
deficit of some $18 billion, or 41% of the available pool of 
development finance.   
Little other published data is available to quantify the extent of 
this contraction.  One set of data from which conclusions can be 
drawn is indicated in Figure 2:  Queensland Commercial Finance 
Commitments.   
 
Figure 2: Queensland Commercial Finance Commitments 
Source:  ABS, Access Economics.  Note data shown as 12 month 
moving average. 
This data clearly indicates a fall in total commercial finance 
commitments in the order of some 25%, but more dramatically a 
70% collapse in commercial finance commitments for dwelling 
construction in Queensland from the peak in 2007 to 2009.   
 
1.4. Structure 
This paper has been structured as follows. Section 1 defined 
development finance, briefly examined the banking industry issues 
and introduced the supply shortfall problem.  Section 2 reviews the 
existing literature and details the methodology applied for this 
research.  It also identifies the key lending criteria relevant to real 
estate development finance.  Section 3 presents the changes to 
credit policies in the pre and post GFC project finance 
environment.  Section 4 examines the associated impact to the real 
estate development industry, and the conclusion is presented in 
Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
Despite the plethora of trade journal and newspaper articles on the 
GFC and the retraction of credit to the property industry, there is 
surprisingly little scholarly work or specific data on this topic in 
Australia or internationally.  The impact of the GFC on the housing 
and REIT sectors has received some analysis, however the halting 
of credit to the real estate development industry has received little 
focus.   
 
2.1. United States Impacts 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) analyse bank lending during the 
GFC in the United States.  What they describe as a ‟banking 
panic„ following the failure of Lehman Brothers resulted in a 
dramatic cut in bank lending to the corporate sector.  Reductions in 
new lending of more than 75% were experienced in October 2008 
compared to 18 months prior.  This drop in supply of credit 
resulted in upward pressure on interest rate spreads, further 
reducing lending by virtue of more expensive cost of funds.   
A less tangible, yet significant impact identified by Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2009) was the disinclination of lenders to extend 
credit to borrowers for which they had no existing relationship. 
Hence borrowers of a liquidity-constrained bank (or other financial 
intermediary) may not have been able to gain refinancing from an 
alternative less constrained bank simply by virtue of no prior 
banking relationship.  ’Thus, some banks may have enough capital 
to make loans, but are unwilling to extend credit to firms with 
which they have no prior relationship.’  Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2009) 
 
2.2. Australian Shocks 
Brown and Davis (2008) discuss the common shocks and spillover 
effects of the US subprime crisis on the Australian banking sector.  
Key shocks identified include preference for liquidity and 
increased risk aversion.  It is this later shock that continues to have 
the biggest impact.  Brown and Davis (2008) propose 
that ‟Australia‟s sub-prime equivalent hangover„ is the banking 
sector‟s exposure to failed and/or distressed non-bank 
financial/investment companies.  The financially engineered 
structures devised by these non-bank financial/investment 
companies created highly leveraged, opaque entities which 
engaged in buying real property assets to repackage and on-sell in a 
unitised form to investors in capital markets.  Banks provided 
relatively low geared loans and held security over the underlying 
assets. 
Brown and Davis explain problems emerged upon 
refinancing when concerns were raised about these highly 
leveraged business models.  With borrowing costs increasing and 
asset values falling, a number of high profile non-bank 
financial/investment companies experienced severe distress and 
even failure e.g., Centro, Rams, Allco Finance Group and MFS.  
Despite the relative resilience of Australia‟s banking sector to the 
GFC, it is the credit exposure arising from the unraveling of these 
financially engineered structures that is the Australian property 
market‟s hangover.  Rather than incur losses associated with asset 
fire sales, these lenders with debt outstanding are collaborating for 
work-outs and repayment extensions.   
Rowland (2010) confirms the banks‟ unwillingness to cause a 
rush of forced sales, by not enforcing their rights to capital 
injections to correct LVR breaches.  Rowland draws on data from 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) to 
conclude that Australian banks have resumed modest lending 
to ‟longstanding clients for well-secured income producing 
properties, but not for development projects.‟  This reference to 
longstanding clients reinforces Ivashina and Scharfstein‟s 
conclusions that a pre-existing banking relationship is a pre-
requisite for any new lending. 
Rowland (2010) presents a further interesting insight into the 
psyche of Australian Banks, citing the memory of the fallout from 
the Australian property bust of 1991 as a key influence in the 
current aversion to property lending.  At that time, failed property 
ventures and repossessions by the banks, combined with a 
depressed property market, resulted in banks holding non-
performing assets and partially completed developments on their 
books for many years until markets rebounded.  Huge losses were 
written off.  Australian Banks are reluctant to repeat those mistakes 
of the 1990s. 
Hence, whilst largely insulated from direct exposure to the 
subprime crisis, Australian banks are carrying over geared property 
assets on their books and are unwilling to increase their exposure 
(i.e. no new lending) to a market in which it is already 
overweight/over exposed.  Any available credit is going only to 
customers with long term banking relationships.  
 
2.3. The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment 
The lending policies and criteria of key financiers are rarely 
explicit in regards to development finance.  Prospective borrowers 
are faced with lengthy negotiation periods following extensive 
information exchange about every detail of the project and the 
borrower themselves.  This complex process is often compressed 
into the ‟Five Cs„ of credit analysis and lending as indicated in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment  
Five ‟Cs‟ Description Includes 
Character Appraisal of the borrower‟s 
integrity 
Character 
Competence 
Identification 
Social and financial 
stability  
Honest and reliable 
Capital Appraisal of the borrower‟s 
financial strength 
Assets & Liability 
statement 
Title searches 
Gearing 
Capacity Analysis of the borrower‟s 
capacity to repay 
Cashflow 
Confirmation of 
income/project 
revenue 
Conditions Analysis of key external and 
internal factors 
Loan conditions 
and covenants 
Market and 
economic 
conditions 
Collateral Appraisal of security 
available to support the 
borrowing 
Mortgage 
Guarantee 
Lein 
Multipartite 
agreements 
Fixed/floating 
charges 
   
Source:  Weaver and Kingsley (2000) and Weerasooria (1998) 
 
When there is more than one provider of finance by virtue of 
separate tranches or syndication, this process is repeated for each 
financier, with varying degree of weight applied to each criteria 
depending on the risk appetite of the financier, their required return 
benchmarks, and their ability to appropriately assess and price the 
risks involved.   
 
2.4. Data and Methodology 
Data for this research was sourced from surveys conducted with 
key property finance executives in Queensland from each of the 
Big four banks as well as from two prominent ‟arrangers„ of 
development finance.  (Arrangers act as an intermediary between 
banks and borrowers to broker and negotiate deals.  In the Pre-GFC 
environment, arrangers may have brokered lending from their own 
mezzanine funds). 
Data was collected on key credit assessment criteria and 
benchmarks: 
 Pre GFC (2007); 
 During the trough of the GFC (2009);  and  
 GFC recovery stage (2010).   
Data for each of these time periods was collected on:  sponsor 
considerations (Character and Capital), acceptable sector and 
location (Conditions), level of pre-sales required (Capacity and 
Conditions), as well as gearing ratios and pricing across various 
funding tranches (Capital and Collateral).  (Note:  Correlation to 
the 5 “C‟s” has been added for emphasis only.) 
Survey data was collated and analysed to identify trend 
movements in key lending criteria, preliminary quantification of 
these trends to support (or otherwise) findings from the literature 
review, and to draw out any other key trends.  
 
 
3. CHANGING CREDIT ENVIRONMENT AND 
LENDING CRITERIA 
The paper so far has been discussion on the credit constrained 
environment in which the development industry now finds itself.  
In this section, findings are discussed from the survey of key 
lenders in Queensland that do have funds available.   
Completed surveys were received from each of the Big 4 banks 
and two leading arrangers of property finance.  Key data has been 
collated and presented in Table 2.  The five key criteria are 
presented and discussed in order of lending priority, with each 
subsequent criteria reliant on the project passing the benchmark for 
the prior criteria, before proceeding to the next level of assessment.  
This sequence was determined though scenario analysis and risk 
assessment.   
Table 2: Changes to Key Lending Criteria  
Development Lending 
Key Lending 
Criteria 
Pre GFC 
(2007) 
GFC Trough 
(2008-2009) 
GFC Recovery 
(2010) 
Sponsor Anyone Only very 
experienced 
 
Experienced – 
very experienced 
Sector All sectors.  
Some were 
specialist in 
Residential 
only  
 
Majority 
residential 
only 
Majority 
residential only.  
Limited appetite 
for other sectors 
 
Location Anywhere in 
Queensland 
 
Major centres 
or SEQ only 
Majority prime 
metropolitan 
locations only 
 
Some appetite 
returning for 
major regional 
 
GEARING 
(LCR) 
- Senior 
- Mezzanine 
- Equity 
 
 
 
80% - 85% 
90% – 100% 
0% - 20% 
 
 
0%-70% 
nil 
25% - 100% 
 
 
60% -75% 
80% - 85% 
15% - 20% 
Pre Sales 
(debt coverage) 
 
0% - 60% 100% - 110% 80% - 100% 
PRICING 
- Senior 
- Mezzanine 
 
1.5% – 2.2% 
15% - 20% 
 
2.5% - 4.5% 
nil 
 
2.5% - 3.5% 
20% - 30% 
    
 
 
3.1. Sponsor (Character and Capital) 
Whilst ‟Anyone„ could borrow money ‟Anywhere„ for ‟Anything‟ 
in 2007 as stated by one respondent, all respondents confirmed that 
only the very experienced operators were able secure finance in 
today‟s market.  Ivashina and Scharfstein‟s proposition in 2009, 
that a prior credit relationship is essential in order to obtain finance, 
did not carry over to 2010 where conditions have eased somewhat.  
Rather, it is the borrower‟s ability to establish their competency as 
a stable, honest and reliable borrower of good character, with 
strong financial credentials and experience in the type of 
development for which they are seeking finance. 
 
3.2. Property Type by Sector and Location 
(Conditions) 
Prior to the GFC, all respondents reported lending across the State 
in a variety of property sectors.  This included residential, 
commercial, industrial and retail not only in South East 
Queensland, but also in regional areas such as Airlie Beach and 
Cairns.   
Funding is now generally only available in prime locations in 
the Brisbane metropolitan area, with even the Gold Coast off the 
radar for many respondents.  Residential development is the 
primary target for respondents, with little or no appetite for lending 
in other sectors.  In saying this, funds are not available for 
residential land banking, i.e. speculative purchase of land without 
approvals in place. 
 
3.3. Gearing and Presales (Capital/Collateral and 
Capacity/Conditions) 
Gearing and presales are like the chicken and the egg:  it is difficult 
to argue which comes first.  LCRs can be crudely interpreted as the 
proportion of total development costs that a lender expects to 
realise at a mortgagee in possession sale should the project fail.  It 
is a key indicator of risk acceptance (or lack thereof when LCRs 
are low).  Hence, whilst gearing is often considered a Capital or 
Collateral consideration, it also has a strong reference to (market) 
Conditions. 
Senior debt lending ratios have rebounded from the trough of 
the GFC, but have not returned to the pre GFC highs.  The ready 
availability of mezzanine lending pre GFC lead to some deals 
transacting with no equity contribution by the developer.  This 
market was perhaps the most impacted by the risk aversion of 
lenders, with only one respondent claiming to have mezzanine 
finance available in the trough.  All other lenders advised this 
source of finance was closed.  Tentative lending for such tranches 
is re-emerging, but at capped out levels, and very heavily priced for 
the risk taken.  The re-emergence of a requirement for true cash 
equity in deals is a consistent finding.  Whereas pre GFC, up to 
100% of all project costs could find external funding, this is no 
longer the case, with developers being required to have up to 20% 
of their own money in the transaction.  This is a key impact that 
will be discussed further in the following section. 
The presale role in lending criteria is two fold.  Firstly, it 
confirms the design and pricing of the product is acceptable to the 
market (Conditions).  Secondly, settlement of presale contracts 
form the future cashflow/revenue for the project and therefore 
confirm the Capacity of the project to repay its debts. 
From the data, it can be inferred that in the current environment 
gearing and presales can be thought of as having a positively 
correlated relationship: the higher the gearing, the higher the level 
of presales required.  Conversely, before the GFC the opposite was 
true, with as little as zero presales required for up to 100% LCR.  
Interestingly, one respondent identified 110% LCR in the trough, 
indicating the impact of settlement risk at the time.  Notes provided 
by respondents indicate that while the 10% deposit clauses were 
not enforced pre GFC, the quality of presale contracts and full 
deposits paid are very much a focus of lenders.  
This change in gearing and presales is very much a 
characteristic of the risk averse environment and the high 
competition for capital, with only the very best projects meeting 
the benchmarks for funding.   
 
3.4. Pricing (Conditions) 
Pricing is the interest charged on drawn funds as expressed as a 
margin over the bank bill swap rate (BBSY).  The margin charged 
has fluctuated dramatically over the survey period, doubling from 
2007 to 2009.  This movement reflects both the higher cost of 
funds to the banks, as well as the higher pricing of risk.  Pricing 
has trended downwards again in 2010, but with margins still 
significantly higher than pre GFC.   
 
3.5. Other Key Findings 
A number of respondents provided comments on various related 
lending matters.  Certain patterns worth noting did emerge in the 
information provided.   
Whilst lending benchmarks were provided for the trough GFC 
period, the consensus was that in reality few, if any, new 
development loans were transacted over that period – the focus was 
on crisis management and managing existing loans.   
Security requirements of banks have increased significantly 
since the GFC.  Non-recourse lending is now generally 
unavailable, whereas it was commonplace pre GFC. 
The mass withdrawal of lenders from this market referred to 
previously was confirmed.  As little as three or four main lenders 
are now reported to be active in development lending, compared to 
in excess of 40 just three years ago.  One of the major impacts 
identified was the total withdrawal of Suncorp from this form of 
lending, and the merger of St George with Westpac.  Clients of 
these banks have had difficulty if they had no other banking 
relationships to draw on.   
Fees have increased significantly post GFC.  In 2009, those 
lending could ask for large fees, as borrowers had few other 
options.   This applies for both Senior Debt and Mezzanine finance.  
Establishment fees of 1.5% and up to 5% respectively are normal 
in the market today.   
The maximum size of deals that banks will lend for has 
reduced significantly.  This is due to a combination of the banks‟ 
reduction in available capital combined with changing APRA 
regulations post GFC that reduced the allowable maximum 
exposure to borrowing entities.  Funding for large scale projects in 
excess of $100 million would still be extremely difficult to obtain. 
 
 
 
4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT 
From the findings of the data collected, it can be concluded that 
funding for development projects is available from some sources, 
however it is extremely difficult for projects and their sponsors to 
meet the banks‟ high credit criteria benchmarks.  The impact of 
this on the development industry and the community in general is 
discussed in this section. 
 
4.1. Equity Contribution 
The re-emergence of the requirement for up to 20% ‟cash„ equity 
in the deal by the developer is a key impact.  In practice this means 
that for every $10m in project costs, the developer needs to be able 
to contribute $2m in equity.  This impact is further amplified by the 
requirement for equity to be ‟first in: last out.‟  In other words, this 
$2m in every $10m must be contributed prior to debt funding 
becoming available.  Hence it is spent in the early project stages 
cashflowing expenses such as acquisition costs, design and other 
consultant fees, marketing expenses, application fees etc.  
Therefore, this equity contribution is not a form of security, sitting 
in other assets.  It must be available as business cashflow to pay for 
these upfront or ‟soft„ costs.   
Cash-strapped developers are having to sell assets, access 
private equity and prioritise projects, spending their limited capital 
on fewer projects, and only those with the least risk of failure.  
 
4.2. Presale Requirements 
Post GFC, banks have dramatically increased their presale 
requirements, now requiring up to 100% debt coverage.  Whilst 
prima facie this appears overly onerous, when combined with the 
lower gearing ratio, analysis indicates very little impact in the 
actual number of presales required.   
For example, a 100 unit complex pre GFC may have obtained 
100% funding on 60% presales.  Assuming a 20% profit margin on 
the project, this crudely equates to 100 x (1-20%) x 100% x 60% = 
48 presales.  In the current environment, the same project may 
qualify for 80% funding on 90% presales.  This equates to 100 x 
(1-20%) x 80% x 90% = 54 presales.  Hence, the actual number of 
presales required is impacted less than expected.   
However, other aspects of presale requirements are having a 
significant impact.  Firstly, before the GFC little attention was paid 
to the nature of presale purchasers and whether or not full deposits 
were being paid.  Further to the emergence of high settlement risk 
during 2008/2009, banks now focus very heavily on presales being 
genuine ‟arms length„ transactions, with full 10% deposits paid.  
Secondly, in a suppressed market pre-sale periods can extend over 
many months with associated high marketing costs.  As discussed 
above, this marketing period is now cashflowed by the developer‟s 
equity.  If presale targets are not met, these expenses can end up 
being sunk costs, which are not recoverable.  Thirdly, tightening 
credit conditions in retail lending has made it more difficult for 
potential buyers to obtain the required unconditional finance 
approvals. Finally, widespread losses in investment portfolios, 
particularly the equities markets, has made it difficult for many 
purchasers to access funds for the 10% deposit required, be it by 
way of cash equity or bank guarantee.  All of these factors 
contribute to an elongated marketing and presale period fully 
funded by the developer‟s own resources, which are at risk until 
the required presales are achieved.   
 
4.3. Cost of Funds 
As discussed in the previous section, the margin charged on senior 
debt for development funding doubled from 2007 to 2009, 
moderating recently as these markets gradually reopen.  However, 
it is interesting to consider the relative interest rate environment 
over the same period.  Table 3 demonstrates the combination of the 
prevailing bank bill swap rate (BBSY) and senior debt margins for 
the survey period.   
 
Table 3: Cost of Funds – Senior Debt  
 
Pre GFC 
(2007) 
GFC Trough 
(2009) 
GFC Recovery 
(2010) 
BBSY* 6.25% 3.5% 4.5% 
Margin  1.5% – 2.2% 2.5% - 4.5% 2.5% - 3.5% 
Cost of Funds 7.75% - 8.45% 6% - 8% 7% - 8% 
*Source: Reserve Bank of Australia  
 
It can be seen that despite large movements in margin, the 
overall cost of funds has not increased that dramatically.  When 
combined with reduced gearing levels, it therefore is probable that 
the overall cost of funds has actually reduced.  
 
4.4. Housing Affordability 
Queensland‟s population growth consistently outperforms the 
national average, particularly in the South East corner of the State. 
Queensland‟s population growth has averaged 2.6% per annum 
between 2002 and 2009 (Queensland Government 2010).  This 
compares with the national average over the corresponding period 
of just 1.5% (ABS 2010).  In real numbers, this equates to an 
average influx to Queensland of approximately 112,900 new 
residents per annum, or at 2.6 persons per household (Queensland 
Government 2010), demand in the order of over 43,000 new 
households each year.   
Housing supply over the corresponding period has not kept up 
with demand, and as indicated in Table 1, with current supply only 
approximately two thirds of underlying demand in 2009, and 
supply meeting demand only one year in the last decade.  
 
Table 1: Qld New Dwelling Commencements 1998 -2009 
 Houses Other Residential Total 
1998 21,925 10,847 32,772 
1999 21,377 8,362 29,739 
2000 19,413 9,640 29,053 
2001 20,449 8,004 28,453 
2002 27,026 12,605 39,631 
2003 27,999 13,403 41,402 
2004 27,339 13,770 41,109 
2005 25,117 13,821 38,938 
2006 25,863 12,923 38,786 
2007 30,429 12,688 43,117 
2008 25,261 12,897 38,158 
2009 20,552 7,925 28,477 
Source: ABS Table 4 and Table 5 
 
The inability to obtain finance, particularly in the apartment 
sector has been cited as one of the key constraints to supply despite 
strong demand fundamentals (Access Economics 2010).  This is 
certainly supported by the statistics above, with the supply of 
‟Other Residential„ dwellings in 2009 falling to a twelve year low. 
Such disequilibrium in markets leads to upward pressure on 
house prices and reduced affordability for home owners.  This 
impact is compounded by the geographical confines of current 
banking policy.  Low cost housing is often in secondary locations, 
which are not receiving support from the banks. 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Early signs of loosening in bank credit policy are emerging.  
However, parties seeking development finance are faced with a 
severely reduced number of institutions from which to source 
funding.  The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only 
the best credit risks by way of constrictive credit conditions 
including:  low loan to value ratios, the corresponding requirement 
to contribute high levels of equity, lack of support in non-prime 
locations and the requirement for only borrowers with well 
established track records.   
In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the 
ability of developers to proceed with real estate developments is 
still being constrained by their inability to obtain project finance.  
One of the key spillover effects of this problem is the 
disequilibrium being created between demand and supply.  
Queensland is facing a supply shortfall, which, if not corrected, 
will lead to upward pressure on house prices, and falling housing 
affordability.  
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